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On Hamilton’s Rule and Inclusive Fitness
Theory with Nonadditive PayoffsSamir Okasha*y
Hamilton’s theory of inclusive ﬁtness is a widely used framework for studying the evo-
lution of social behavior, but controversy surrounds its status. Hamilton originally de-
rived his famous rb > c rule for the spread of a social gene by assuming additivity of
costs and beneﬁts. However, it has recently been argued that the additivity assumption
can be dispensed with, so long as the 2c and b terms are suitably deﬁned, as partial re-
gression coefﬁcients. I argue that this way of generalizing Hamilton’s rule to the nonad-
ditive case, while formally correct, faces conceptual problems.1. Introduction. Hamilton (1964) derived his famous rule for the spread
of an allele that causes a social behavior, rb > c, by assuming both additivity
of costs and beneﬁts and weak selection. Much subsequent work on inclu-
sive ﬁtness and kin selection has also relied on these assumptions, a fact that
has led some biologists to complain that Hamilton’s rule, and kin selection
theory more generally, is of rather limited applicability (van Veelen 2009;
Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson 2010, 2011; Allen, Nowak, and Wilson 2013).
In response to this complaint, recent studies by Gardner, West, and Wild
(2011) andMarshall (2011, 2015) argue that when the ‘r’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ terms
are appropriately understood, Hamilton’s rule is in fact a fully general and
exact statement about natural selection that requires neither additivity nor
weak selection. These studies build on earlier work in a similar vein by
Queller (1992a, 1992b) and Frank (1997, 1998), who derived a generalized
form of Hamilton’s rule from the Price equation.*To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, 9 Woodland Rd.,
Bristol BS8 1TB, United Kingdom; e-mail: Samir.Okasha@bristol.ac.uk.
yThanks to Johannes Martens, Jonathan Birch, Andy Gardner, James Marshall, and
Alan Grafen for comments and discussion. This work was supported by the European
Research Council Seventh Framework Program (FP7/20072013), ERC grant agreement
295449.
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All uThis article offers a critical reassessment of the debate over the gener-
ality of Hamilton’s rule and kin selection theory (see also Birch 2014;
Birch and Okasha 2015). My main focus will be on additivity rather than
weak selection (although the two issues are linked, since if weak selection
is assumed, then additivity of costs and beneﬁts can often be justiﬁed as a
linear approximation). In brief, I argue that the generalized version of
Hamilton’s rule favored by Frank (1997, 1998), Gardner et al. (2011),
and Marshall (2011), although correct as a statement about allele fre-
quency change, is conceptually impoverished compared to Hamilton’s
original. This is so for two reasons, both to do with the failure of additivity.
The ﬁrst reason is that without additivity, the generalized form of Hamilton’s
rule has limited biological meaning, as its components lack a natural causal
interpretation. The second reason is that without additivity, the link between
Hamilton’s rule and the idea that natural selection leads organisms to behave
‘as if ’ trying to maximize their inclusive ﬁtness breaks down.
2. Two Aspects of Kin Selection Theory. As is well known, kin selection
theory in the Hamiltonian tradition contains two distinct although related
ideas (Okasha and Martens 2016b). The ﬁrst is Hamilton’s rule itself, the
rule-of-thumb criterion (rb > c) for when an allele that causes a social be-
havior will be favored by natural selection, where c is the cost to the actor, b
the beneﬁt to the recipient, and r the ‘coefﬁcient of relationship’ between
them. The second is the idea that individuals will behave ‘as if’ trying to
maximize their inclusive ﬁtness, a measure that takes into account an indi-
vidual’s contribution to the reproductive success of its relatives, rather than
their classical (or ‘personal’) ﬁtness.1
These two aspects of kin selection theory have not always been sharply
distinguished; as a result, the relation between them is not fully settled.
Many expositions of Hamilton’s theory (e.g., Bourke 2011; Marshall 2015)
focus exclusively on the ﬁrst aspect. However, recently Grafen (2006, 2009),
Gardner et al. (2011), and Queller (2011) have argued for the central im-
portance of the idea of inclusive ﬁtness maximization as the ‘goal’ of an
individual’s social behavior. Moreover, Grafen (2006) tries to integrate
this idea with an explicit population-genetic description of the evolution
of social behavior, which goes some way toward bringing the two aspects
of kin selection theory into harmony with each other.
Importantly, the analysis of Grafen (2006) assumes additivity of costs
and beneﬁts, as he points out. In the context of the debate over the gener-
ality of Hamilton’s rule, this prompts an immediate question. If we follow1. This maximization claim should be distinguished from the claim that selection will
act to maximize the average inclusive ﬁtness of the whole population; the latter claim
is found in Hamilton (1964), the former in Hamilton (1970).
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HAMILTON’S RULE AND INCLUSIVE FITNESS 875Gardner et al. (2011) and others who favor a generalized version of Ham-
ilton’s rule, which holds true even in the nonadditive case, can we recover the
principle of inclusive ﬁtness maximization using an argument similar to that
of Grafen (2006)? I argue that the answer is no, for conceptual rather than
technical reasons. In particular, if we deﬁne the cost and beneﬁt terms the
way they must be deﬁned for Hamilton’s rule to be a universally correct state-
ment, as partial regression coefﬁcients, then the inclusive ﬁtness that results is
not a quantity that individuals can sensibly be regarded as trying to maxi-
mize, as it is not solely a function of their own behavior.
3. Nonadditivity: Preliminaries. To focus the issue, consider ﬁrst a gene
for a nonsocial trait that affects individual ﬁtness. Assuming no mutation or
gametic selection, the one-generation change in the population-wide fre-
quency of the gene is given by
Dp 5
Cov(wi, pi)
w
, (1)
where wi is the ﬁtness (i.e., gametic output) of the ith individual, pi is the
frequency of the gene in the ith individual, p is the population-wide fre-
quency of the gene, and w is average population ﬁtness (Price 1970). Pre-
suming that Var(pi) > 0, the covariance term in equation (1) can be decom-
posed to give
Dp 5 bwp
Var(pi)
w
, (2)
where bwp is the linear regression of individual ﬁtness wi on individual gene
frequency pi. So the condition for the gene to increase is bwp > 0. Note that
(1) follows from (2) simply by the deﬁnition of the linear regression coef-
ﬁcient. Note also that (1) and (2) would both hold true if for pi and p we
substituted the ‘breeding value’ of some phenotypic trait and its population-
wide average (Grafen 1985; Falconer 1995).
Equation (2) makes no assumption that the true causal dependence of wi
on pi is linear. Even if that dependence is highly nonlinear, the slope of the
best-ﬁt regression line of ﬁtness against individual gene frequency is what
determines whether the gene will spread. Suppose, for example, that the
true causal relation is given by wi 5 1 1 bp
2
i , where b > 0, which means
that the ﬁtness difference between individuals with zero and one copies
of the gene is less than that between individuals with one and two copies.
This has two important implications. First, the linear regression coefﬁcient
bwp will be a function of the population’s genotypic composition, so it will
change as the population evolves. By contrast if wi depends linearly on pi,
then bwp will be independent of the gene’s frequency in the population.This content downloaded from 137.222.138.047 on December 15, 2016 07:13:15 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
876 SAMIR OKASHA
All uSecond, in the nonlinear case bwp cannot be construed as a measure of the
strength of the causal inﬂuence of the gene on ﬁtness and is not counter-
factually informative. That is, bwp does not tell us the ﬁtness difference that
an individual would incur if she were to receive an extra copy of the gene.
Rather, bwp is a measure of the average ﬁtness difference between individ-
uals with x and x1 1 copies of the gene in the actual population. This is an
instance of a well-known point in the statistics literature, namely, that a lin-
ear regression analysis can only be used to tell us the effect of a hypothetical
intervention if the regression model correctly describes the true causal rela-
tions in the world (see, e.g., Gelman and Hill 2007, chap. 9). The relevance
of this for Hamilton’s rule will become clear.
This last point can be made more vivid by noting that equations (1) and
(2) hold true even if the gene has no causal effect at all on an individual’s
ﬁtness but correlates with ﬁtness for some other reason. In such a circum-
stance, the value of bwp may be substantial, but if an individual in the pop-
ulation were given another copy of the gene, for example, by mutation, her
ﬁtness would remain unchanged. As in the nonlinear case, the fact that bwp
correctly predicts the evolutionary change, but does not correctly predict
the effect of hypothetical alterations to an individual’s genotype, reﬂects
the fact that the simple linear regression of wi on pi does not correctly
model the true causal determinants of individual ﬁtness.
This leads to our ﬁnal preliminary point. Although we stipulated above
that the gene codes for a nonsocial trait, this fact plays no role in the deri-
vation of equation (1), which in fact holds true quite generally. An impor-
tant consequence of this, emphasized by Grafen (2002), is that one cannot
infer from equation (1) that selection will lead individuals to maximize their
individual ﬁtness wi. This is generally true for a nonsocial trait but not for a
social trait, yet equation (1) applies in both cases. Grafen (2002) captures
this point by distinguishing between a ‘target for selection’, that is, a quan-
tity that covaries with pi in equation (1), from an ‘individual maximand’,
that is, a quantity that an individual behaves as if trying to maximize. The
point can equally be captured by noting that in the social case, an individ-
ual’s ﬁtness wi does not causally depend solely on its own genotype pi but
also on the genotypes of its social partners. So it does not make sense to
regard wi as a quantity that an individual might seek to maximize through
its behavioral choices. As before, the linear regression bwp correctly pre-
dicts the evolutionary change, but its value does not solely reﬂect the direct
causal inﬂuence of pi on wi, and this is precisely the reason why individual
behavior does not maximize wi.
4. Hamilton’s Rule Generalized. A generalized version of Hamilton’s
rule is easily derived from equation (1), following Queller (1992a, 1992b),
Frank (1997, 1998), and Gardner et al. (2011). Suppose that the gene codesThis content downloaded from 137.222.138.047 on December 15, 2016 07:13:15 AM
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HAMILTON’S RULE AND INCLUSIVE FITNESS 877for a social action, so an individual’s ﬁtness wi depends on both its own gene
frequency pi and the gene frequency of its social partners p0i. We then write
wi as a linear regression on pi and p0i:
wi 5 a 1 bwp : p0pi 1 bwp0 : p p
0
i 1 ei, (3)
where a is ‘baseline’ ﬁtness; bwp : p0 is the partial regression of individual
ﬁtness on individual gene frequency, controlling for social partners’ gene
frequency; bwp0 : p is the partial regression of individual ﬁtness on social part-
ners’ gene frequency, controlling for individual gene frequency; and ei is
the residual whose variance is to be minimized. Note that equation (3) does
not presume that pi and p0i make additive contributions to an individual’s
ﬁtness, although if they do not, our previous caveats about not interpreting
regression coefﬁcients as measures of causal inﬂuence apply.
Equation (3) can then be substituted into equation (1), which after sim-
pliﬁcation yields
Dp 5 (bwp : p0 1 bwp0 : pr)
Var(p)
w
, (4)
where r 5 bp0p 5 Cov(p, p
0)=Var(p) is the regression of social partners’
genotype on individual genotype, which is one standard deﬁnition of the
coefﬁcient of relatedness. Equation (4) is a version of Hamilton’s rule in
its ‘neighbor-modulated’ form, that is, that considers the effects on a focal
individual’s ﬁtness of the genes (and hence actions) of its social partners.
As Hamilton (1964) ﬁrst showed, we can instead consider the effects of a
focal individual’s genes (and hence actions) on the ﬁtness of her social part-
ners, rather than vice versa. The relevant regression coefﬁcient correspond-
ing to this effect is bw0p : p0 , that is, the partial regression of social partners’
ﬁtness on an individual’s gene frequency, controlling for the social part-
ners’ gene frequency. It is well known that under quite general conditions,
bwp0 : p 5 bw0p : p0 , which means that equation (4) can be rewritten as
Dp 5 (bwp : p0 1 bw0p : p0r)
Var(p)
w
: (5)
By labeling bwp : p0 and bw0p : p0 as ‘2c’ and ‘b’ respectively, we can see that the
condition for the spread of the allele in the population is rb > c, which is
Hamilton’s rule in its traditional guise. This version of Hamilton’s rule is em-
ployed by Queller (1992a), Frank (1997, 1998), Gardner et al. (2011), and
Marshall (2011, 2015).
As Frank (1997) and Gardner et al. (2011) rightly stress, equation (5) is a
fully general truth about evolution by natural selection that simply parti-
tions the total evolutionary change into direct and indirect components
and is thus as general as the Price equation itself. In particular, neither weakThis content downloaded from 137.222.138.047 on December 15, 2016 07:13:15 AM
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All uselection nor additivity of costs and beneﬁts is needed to derive (5), a fact
that Gardner et al. (2011) use to rebut the charge of limited generality lev-
eled against kin selection theory by authors such as Nowak et al. (2010,
2011).
5. Three Issues. The crux of the matter here is whether it is legitimate to
identify the 2c and b terms of Hamilton’s rule with the partial regression
coefﬁcients bwp : p0 and bw0p : p0 , derived from the multiple regression equa-
tion (3). If this identiﬁcation is granted, then Hamilton’s rule does indeed
obtain with complete generality, irrespective of additivity or weak selection.
Gardner et al. (2011) insist that deﬁning costs and beneﬁts as partial regres-
sion coefﬁcients, that is, average effects, is perfectly correct and indeed crit-
icize other authors for not realizing this and adopting ‘arbitrary’ deﬁnitions
of the 2c and b terms. However, this raises three interpretive issues.
The ﬁrst concerns causality. Hamilton’s original papers deliberately em-
ploy causal language to describe the ﬁtness costs and beneﬁts of social ac-
tions (Hamilton 1964, 1970). He is explicit that the ‘cost’ in question is the
reduction in personal reproduction caused by a social action (or gene), and
similarly for the beneﬁt. But as stressed above, partial regression coefﬁ-
cients can only be construed as causal under certain circumstances; in par-
ticular, the regression model must truly describe the causal dependence of
the dependent variable on the independent ones. Now if the true depen-
dence of wi on pi and p0i is nonadditive, or if there are other variables that
causally affect wi and are correlated with pi or p0i, then the regression coef-
ﬁcients bwp : p0 and bwp0 : p cannot be regarded as natural measures of the causal
inﬂuence of pi and p0i on ﬁtness. Indicative of this is that if we take a given
individual who does not have the gene in question and so does not perform
the social action and ask what the effect on her individual ﬁtness would be if
she did perform the social action while holding ﬁxed her social partners,
then the answer is not given by bwp : p0 (see Okasha and Martens 2016a).
So while it is possible to derive equation (5) in the nonadditive case, iden-
tifying its components with the2c and b terms of Hamilton’s rule sacriﬁces
the causal understanding of these terms.2
The second issue concerns biological signiﬁcance. As Frank (1997, 1998)
and Queller (2011) both stress, it is possible to use any ‘predictors’ as inde-
pendent variables in a multiple regression analysis. There is nothing sacro-
sanct about the choice of pi and p0i as predictors in equation (3); other predic-
tors such as the product pi : p
0
i, or p
2
i , could easily be added, which would
lead the total evolutionary change to be partitioned up differently from2. Okasha and Martens (2016a) explore a possible way of salvaging the causal interpre-
tation of Hamilton’s rule, by drawing on an argument made by Fisher (1941) in relation
to his concept of ‘average effect of a gene substitution’.
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HAMILTON’S RULE AND INCLUSIVE FITNESS 879equation (5). Ideally, we want a good partition to have components that are
biologically meaningful. Now if wi depends nonadditively on pi and p0i, then
arguably equation (5) fails this criterion. Indicative of this is that the values
of bwp : p0 and bw0p : p0 then become functions of the population’s genotypic
composition, as discussed previously. From this perspective, it seems that
insisting on applying equation (5) even in nonadditive situations, and pre-
serving the generality of Hamilton’s rule by identifying the2c and b terms
with the bwp : p0 and bw0p : p0 coefﬁcients, comes at the expense of its biological
signiﬁcance (see Allen et al. 2013; Birch 2014; Birch and Okasha 2015, for
further discussion).
The third issue is the most important and concerns inclusive ﬁtness max-
imization. As discussed above, kin selection theory contains two distinct
ideas: the rb > c criterion for the spread of a gene for social actions and in-
clusive ﬁtness maximization as the ‘goal’ of individual behavior. Even if we
are happy to identify the bwp : p0 and bw0p : p0 coefﬁcients of equation (5) with
the 2c and b terms of Hamilton’s rule, this only speaks to the ﬁrst part
of kin selection theory; that is, it shows that the rb > c criterion is univer-
sally valid. But does it also allow us to recover maximization of inclusive
ﬁtness as a universally valid principle? This question is not directly ad-
dressed by the authors who favor the generalized form of Hamilton’s rule;
however, Gardner et al. strongly imply that the answer is yes; they write of
equation (5) that “the partition of natural selection into direct and indirect
components will exactly correspond with the direct and indirect compo-
nents of inclusive ﬁtness; the quantity that organisms are designed to max-
imize (Hamilton 1964, 1996; Grafen 2006) which better clariﬁes the link
between the process and purpose of Darwinian adaptation” (Gardner et al.
2011, 1032).
However, this is a questionable claim. The most careful elaboration of
the connection between gene frequency change and inclusive ﬁtness max-
imization is due to Grafen (2006), whose analysis is explicitly restricted to
the case in which costs and beneﬁts are additive. One might hope that this
restriction could be lifted with further work, that is, that an argument akin to
Grafen’s could be developed for the more general nonadditive case, which
is presumably what Gardner et al. (2011) believe. But this suggestion faces
an immediate conceptual problem, given that the bwp : p0 and bw0p : p0 terms in
equation (5) are functions of the population’s genotypic composition in the
nonadditive case. To see the problem, we need to brieﬂy expound the log-
ical structure of Grafen’s (2006) argument.
6. Grafen’s Defense of Inclusive Fitness Maximization. Grafen’s ap-
proach is to use a fully explicit deﬁnition of optimization and then to seek
links between the optimality of individual behavior, in social contexts, and
population genetics. The notion of optimization is captured by an ‘objectiveThis content downloaded from 137.222.138.047 on December 15, 2016 07:13:15 AM
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All ufunction’ that maps an individual’s phenotype (or behavior) to the real num-
bers; if individuals achieve the maximum value of this function they are
said to ‘behave optimally’. What Grafen then shows is that if the objective
function is taken to be inclusive ﬁtness, deﬁned as (rb 2 c), then certain
logical links between optimality and gene frequency change will hold. In
effect, these links say that if and only if every individual chooses a behav-
ior that maximizes her inclusive ﬁtness, then population-genetic equilib-
rium will result; that is, no gene frequency change will occur and no mutants
can invade. Grafen (2006) argues that this constitutes a formal vindication
of Hamilton’s idea that natural selection on genes for social actions will
lead individuals to behave as if maximizing their inclusive ﬁtness.3
From this brief description of Grafen’s argument, one point should al-
ready be clear. It is essential that the ‘objective function’, whatever it is
taken to be, should be a function solely of an individual’s choice of behav-
ior. This is because the point of the argument is to represent individuals as
akin to rational agents, choosing between alternative behaviors according
to how well they score on some criterion, like the utility maximizers of
economic theory. When the objective function is taken to be inclusive ﬁt-
ness, this requirement is satisﬁed, given that Grafen deﬁnes the costs and
beneﬁts in Hamilton’s original way, as ﬁtness increments caused by indi-
viduals’ social actions. Indeed Grafen explicitly incorporates an assump-
tion that he calls ‘actor’s control’, which says that the individual actor
“controls both the performance of the action and its quantitative conse-
quences” (2006, 553); this implies that the beneﬁt bij conferred by individ-
ual i on individual j “will depend only on the phenotype of individual i”
(554). It is precisely because of this that it makes sense to regard individ-
uals as trying to maximize their inclusive ﬁtness (i.e., rb 2 c), as the
amount of inclusive ﬁtness that an individual obtains depends solely on
what behavior it performs.
It should now be clear why Grafen’s argument does not readily general-
ize to the nonadditive case, where the costs and beneﬁts are deﬁned as the
partial regression coefﬁcients of equation (5). For if inclusive ﬁtness is de-
ﬁned using these costs and beneﬁts, the assumption of ‘actor’s control’ im-
mediately fails, since the values of bwp : p0 and bw0p : p0 depend on the popula-
tion’s genetic composition. Therefore, the amount of inclusive ﬁtness that
an individual gets will not depend solely on its choice of social action; it
will also depend on population-wide gene frequencies. So conceptually, it
does not make sense to treat (bwp : p0 1 bw0p : p0r) as a quantity that an individ-
ual might seek to maximize through its choice of action. Thus, when Gard-
ner et al. suggest that “we can imagine the individual adjusting her inclusive3. For discussion of the logic of Grafen’s argument, see the symposium on Grafen’s
work in the special edition of Biology and Philosophy 29, no. 2 (2015).
This content downloaded from 137.222.138.047 on December 15, 2016 07:13:15 AM
se subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
HAMILTON’S RULE AND INCLUSIVE FITNESS 881ﬁtness . . . by altering her behaviour” (2011, 1039–40), in an allusion to
Grafen’s argument, they are illicitly generalizing from the additive case,
in which inclusive ﬁtness is solely a function of individual behavior, to
the general case in which it is not. There is a principled reason why a
Grafen-style argument for inclusive ﬁtness maximization cannot apply, if
the costs and beneﬁts are deﬁned as partial regression coefﬁcients in the
manner of equation (5).
The point can be seen from another perspective, by returning to Grafen’s
distinction between ‘target of selection’ and ‘individual maximand’. In the
example of equation (1) applied to a gene coding for a social trait, we saw
that although bwp is the correct criterion for the spread of the gene, it is not
true that individual ﬁtness wi is the maximand of an individual’s behavior; it
cannot be since an individual’s wi does not depend solely on its own be-
havior. A similar moral applies in the case of equation (5), the generalized
Hamilton’s rule, applied to the case of nonadditive costs and beneﬁts. The
criterion for the spread of the gene is (bwp : p0 1 bw0p : p0r) > 0, but it is not true
that individuals will behave as if maximizing (bwp : p0 1 bw0p : p0r); they cannot
do this, since the value of that quantity that an individual receives does not
solely depend on its own behavior. In both cases, the target of selection can-
not be equated with the maximand of individual behavior, for the same rea-
son. This highlights the crucial importance of the notion of actor’s control
for arguments about optimization.
The point can also be related to our foregoing observations about causal-
ity. A rational agent seeking to maximize its inclusive ﬁtness, or an organ-
ism modeled as such an agent, needs to be able consider the consequences
for its inclusive ﬁtness of different possible actions. Thus, they must enter-
tain conditional statements such as “if I were to perform action x, I would
suffer cost c, but reap indirect beneﬁts rb.” But as we have seen, in the gen-
eral case the partial regression coefﬁcients bwp : p0 and bw0p : p0 cannot be equated
with the costs and (indirect) beneﬁts that an individual would have ob-
tained by hypothetically altering its value of pi (i.e., its action) while keeping
p0i ﬁxed; such an interpretation is only permissible if the true causal depen-
dence of wi on pi and p0i is additive. So while it is true that in the nonadditive
case, the average effects bwp : p0 and bw0p : p0 are what matter to natural selection,
in that they determine the gene frequency change, they are not what matter
to an individual agent deliberating about what to do.
Is there any way to salvage the idea of inclusive ﬁtness maximization for
the case of nonadditive payoffs? The fact that Grafen’s own argument re-
quires additivity, because of his assumption of actor’s control, does not pre-
clude some other argument for the desired conclusion being given. Okasha
and Martens (2016b) develop a different way of formalizing the idea that
evolution will lead individuals to engage in maximizing behavior, in rela-
tion to symmetric two-player games; the idea is simply to ﬁnd a utility func-This content downloaded from 137.222.138.047 on December 15, 2016 07:13:15 AM
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All ution such that when both players play Nash equilibrium strategies, evolu-
tionary equilibrium obtains and vice versa. Unlike Grafen’s approach, this
approach can in principle handle nonadditive payoffs, since instead of sim-
ple optimization it substitutes ‘best response’, that is, optimal behavior con-
ditional on a partner’s behavior. However, it does not vindicate inclusive
ﬁtness maximization. By considering a simple nonadditive prisoner’s di-
lemma model of social evolution (or ‘synergy game’), Okasha and Martens
(2016b) ﬁnd that at evolutionary equilibrium, the relevant utility function,
which individuals behave as if they are trying to maximize, is not the inclu-
sive ﬁtness function. This result suggests that recovering inclusive ﬁtness
maximization for nonadditive payoffs is unlikely to work.
7. Conclusion. The view that Hamilton’s rule represents a fully general
statement about natural selection, which holds true irrespective of whether
costs and beneﬁts are additive, is an interesting one. Recent work has shown
clearly that this view is correct, so long as the2c and b terms are appropri-
ately deﬁned as average effects, that is, partial regression coefﬁcients, as in
equation (5). However, when costs and beneﬁts are deﬁned this way, the
causal meaning and biological signiﬁcance of the rule are arguably sacri-
ﬁced, and moreover, the ‘inclusive ﬁtness’ that results is not a quantity that
individual organisms can sensibly be thought of as trying to maximize. So
while the ﬁrst aspect of kin selection theory (the rb > c criterion for allele
frequency change) can be salvaged as a fully general principle, applicable
even if costs and beneﬁts are nonadditive, the second aspect of the theory
(individuals behaving as if maximizing inclusive ﬁtness) is a rather different
matter. While there may be a way of extending this second idea to the non-
additive case, it is unclear how this can be done; Grafen’s (2006) argument
will not work, since it requires that an individual’s objection function de-
pend only on her choice of action, and the game-theoretic approach devel-
oped by Okasha and Martens (2016b) suggests that inclusive ﬁtness is not
in fact the quantity that individuals will behave as if they want to maximize,
in a simple nonadditive model.REFERENCES
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